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Decades into the internet revolution, new business functions are still making
their way online.
The next stage of the digital ecosystem will involve
trillions of networked devices, across every industry
and sphere of human activity. This phenomenon can
be thought of as the “Internet of the World.” It can be
seen in the intersection of three highly visible trends:
The On-Demand Economy, the Internet of Things,
and Big Data. Together they mark a global sea-change
that will penetrate every sector of the economy (see
Exhibit 1).
Companies taking advantage of these three
interconnected trends are experiencing tremendous
growth.1 Roughly six years after it launched, Uber is
the world’s most valuable private company, raising its
latest funding round at a valuation of $62.5 billion.2
It now operates in over 300 cities worldwide and has
over one million drivers in its network.3 Airbnb is not
far behind. Its valuation in its latest funding round
is $30 billion,4 and it has grown to over one million
rooms worldwide, more than traditional hotel chains
such as Marriott and Hilton.5 The potential scale of
on-demand services is also much greater than the
legacy industries they challenge. By changing the
nature of the marketplace, on-demand services actually
create new demand. And the impacts are not limited
to the customer side. Millions of people around the

SUMMARY
• The next stage in the evolution of the digital economy involves the
creation of what can be called the “Internet of the World”—an
expanding web of transactions, anticipated today by on-demand
platforms such as Uber and Airbnb, that eventually will occur
across trillions of networked devices and penetrate every sphere
of human activity.
• These novel on-demand services are raising many thorny legal
questions. This brief looks in particular at the regulatory classification of on-demand services, as well as the application of
antitrust provisions, the imposition of taxes and fees, and the
assignment of liability to these new platforms.
• These legal issues, however, are not novel. History suggests
that regulators and business innovators will work together to
address them as the Internet of the World continues to evolve.
As observed in the early days of the commercial internet, leaders
in the emerging digital economy will welcome further government engagement, which can serve business interests in many
ways. And policymakers will embrace creative solutions that
meet regulatory goals without imposing standards created for
legacy industries that are ill-suited to new platforms.
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world are becoming providers through
these platforms, experiencing a new
form of on-demand work.
Just as electronic commerce, online
communications, and digital content
distribution transformed markets
beginning in the late 1990s, broadband and social networks in the early
2000s, and mobile services in the late
2000s, the Internet of the World will
disrupt existing industries and create
new ones, and in the process, will pose
dramatic challenges for businesses,
regulators, and policymakers. Early
manifestations of this evolution are
raising serious legal questions, involving regulatory classification, competition, taxation, consumer protection,
and other controversies. Debates are
raging over whether novel services
such as Uber and Airbnb should be
subject to rules designed for legacy
industries. The stage seems set for a
decisive battle between regulation
and innovation. Yet this perspective
is mistaken. It is rooted in a pervasive and persistent misunderstanding
about a “digital dichotomy,” which
views online transactions and connections as being fundamentally different
from interactions in the “real world.”
Consequently, the great innovative
business success stories of the last two
decades have involved waves of hype

EXHIBIT 1: DEFINING FEATURES OF THE INTERNET OF THE WORLD
On-Demand Economy Platforms		

• Use software and networks to liberate and aggregate otherwise-independent spare labor or asset
capacity
• Respond to consumer demand in real time, replicating the immediacy and rapid scalability of ecommerce services such as Netflix or iTunes
• Do not own the assets to which they offer access, but create virtual marketplaces using the internet
and mobile devices (i.e., the software representation of the asset effectively becomes the asset)
• Dedicated to maximizing revenues and profits, despite sometimes being described as the Sharing
Economy
The Internet of Things (IoT)		

• Involves network connectivity for devices other than personal computers, phones, and tablets
• Turns anything not traditionally a computing device into a network-aware source of data collection or
manipulation6
• Aggregates individual devices into networked systems, which in turn can shape their actions
• Cisco predicts that by 2020, there will be 50 billion non-computing devices connected to the internet, many times the number of PCs and smartphones7
Big Data Capabilities

• The assembly of massive data sets of information about people and the world, enabled by the emergence of cloud computing and networked data centers that can process vast amounts of data within
the network
• The distillation and analysis of those data sets as a whole (i.e., instead of through the statistical
method of sampling), thus allowing entire data sets to be run through computer-driven algorithms
and generating predictive models that find patterns in networks of correlations

businesses will welcome government engagement, and regulatory
actors will accept creative solutions
to achieve their policy goals. We can
expect such a resolution because the

about unstoppable disruption alternating with periods of backlash over
threats to long-established industries
and well-functioning markets.
Ultimately, though, emerging
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In the case of Uber and Airbnb, the “things” are not directly connected as with networked sensors; a smartphone or
tablet serves as the interface that links the physical asset
into the network, with a human in between. From the
user’s standpoint, however, this distinction is immaterial.
7 Dave Evans, The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolution of the Internet Is Changing Everything, Cisco White
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about/ac79/docs/innov/IoT_IBSG_0411FINAL.pdf.
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NEW ENTERPRISES, OLD
PROBLEMS, AND CREATIVE
COMPROMISES

and industries can serve a number of
positive goals. These include:
• Legitimizing new business models
• Facilitating competition in cases of
market failure
• Increasing trust in new services by
setting baselines and remedies
• Restraining other government actors
from harmful decisions
• Eliminating situations in which
vague or overlapping obligations
create difficulties for new entrants.
Government can also take an
affirmative stand in favor of innovation or new entrants, such as by
delaying the imposition of particular
industry requirements or imposing limitations on established firms
that might crush newcomers. In the
last few years, as the On-Demand
Economy has evolved, controversies have arisen about the legality of
on-demand services under local and
state laws; responsibility for taxes and
fees; data privacy; consumer protection requirements; compliance with
the Americans with Disabilities Act;
anti-competitive practices; discrimination; and the legal status of workers.
The next section of this brief will take
a closer look at these different controversies, and place them into context
with similar debates that erupted
earlier in the dotcom era.

exact same story played out twenty
years ago, in the early days of the
commercial internet.

CYBER HISTORY AS A GUIDE
Twenty years ago, a wave of startups such as Netscape, eBay, Yahoo!,
Amazon burst on the scene with
hyperbolic growth rates, generating dramatic impacts on established
industries. Legal and regulatory
controversies ensued. The debates
followed a common pattern: oscillation between calls for self-regulation
or unregulation, on the one hand, and
clumsy efforts to impose excessive
regulation, on the other, eventually
giving way to accommodations in
which government played more of a
convening, legitimizing, and enforcement role than a rule-setter. Historical
examples of internet businesses and
policymakers recognizing government’s potentially constructive role
in the digital economy include the
Microsoft antitrust case, the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), and
the push for network neutrality rules
against discrimination by broadband
access providers.8
Policymakers and regulators would
do well to remember that government
engagement with innovative markets

Predictably, the initial position of
on-demand and other startups is that
they cannot and should not be subject
to legacy regulations, and therefore
should be left to regulate themselves.
Equally unsurprising is the contrary
movement urging that the on-demand
providers be barred from operating
unless they meet the requirements of
existing regulations. Neither option
is tenable. Fortunately, the dotcom
era startups of the 1990s and those
of today’s Internet of the World face
similar policy challenges, which are
playing out in a familiar pattern.
REGULATORY CLASSIFICATION
The first and most prominent issue
concerns how to classify new services that do not easily fit into available legal categories. Today, Uber’s
business model of entering markets
without legal authorization is most
directly analogous to peer-to-peer
startups like Skype. Of the 276 cities
in which Uber operated at the end of
2014, only 17 had passed ordinances
expressly authorizing its business.9 In
most major cities around the world,
for-hire transportation service can

NOTES
highway: A Reply to Professor Yoo,” Jurimetrics Journal
47 (2007), 383, 384–89.
9 Eva Grantsimran Khosla, “Here’s Everywhere Uber is
Banned Around the World,” Business Insider, April 8,
2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-everywhere-uber-is-banned-around-the-world-2015-4.
10 There appears to be a contrast to the parallel dotcom era
startups, namely that many of the rules governing ondemand service providers are local instead of national or
global, but the basic controversies cover similar ground.
The ultimate equilibrium for services such as Uber is likely

to involve similar treatment in all major cities.
Mike Isaac, “Airbnb Pledges to Work With Cities and Pay
‘Fair Share’ of Taxes,” New York Times, November 11,
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/technology/
airbnb-pledges-to-work-with-cities-and-pay-fair-shareof-taxes.html.
12 Felix Barber, “How Do We Fight 21st Century Monopolies like Amazon, Google and Uber?” Upstart Business
Journal, December 11, 2014, http://upstart.bizjournals.
com/resources/author/2014/12/11/fight-21st-centurymonopolies-like-amazon-uber.html?page=all.
11
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only be provided by licensed taxis or
licensed livery services. Uber, which
views itself as a software application
that matches independent drivers and riders, fits neither category
well. Accordingly, the company has
waged an aggressive campaign against
localities refusing to authorize its
business.10
The key for Skype was that
regulators were convinced the company actually promoted public policy
goals and that necessary obligations
could be enforced without forcing
the company into legacy regulatory
classifications. Major on-demand
platforms have begun to advocate for
a similar approach, focusing on targeted initiatives to address recognized
problems. For example, Airbnb in
November 2015 issued a “Community
Compact” detailing affirmative steps it
would take to work with regulators on
acknowledged issues.11
The process has gone farthest in
the ride-hailing market. At least 29
states have adopted laws defining and
regulating “transportation network
companies” (TNCs), with legislation
under consideration in several others.
These laws provide an opportunity to
ensure that the public policy goals of
traditional regulations are achieved,
even when the business model

COMPETITION
Even the most mature on-demand
markets are still young and fastchanging, so antitrust authorities
have been hesitant to intervene, but
over time, concerns over competition may escalate. Uber, because of its
hyperbolic growth and dominance in
ride-hailing markets, has already been
subject to attacks as a monopolist after
just six years in business.12 A counterargument to accusations of monopolistic behavior is that on-demand
markets have little in the way of entry
barriers from a technical standpoint.
As a result, there is reason to believe
market discipline will self-correct
for anti-competitive practices. This
perspective, however, fails to take into
account novel concerns that arise in
an environment where physical assets
and even people can be treated as
information and manipulated through
software driven by big data analytics.
Today’s on-demand and IoT services
are based on software algorithms
driven by significant volumes of realtime data. The data itself potentially
becomes the foundation for what have
been called “algorithmic monopo-

lies.”13 The more data a service has,
the better the quality of its decisions.
Just as the Microsoft antitrust case
forced an examination of the growing
importance of personal computer software to existing and developing industries, on-demand services will bring
algorithmic competition policy questions to the fore. Even when there are
no entry barriers in the conventional
sense, a dominant player with control
over data may have an insurmountable
edge over potential competitors.14 In
the case of Uber, the market “is” whatever Uber’s algorithms say it is. The
software controls not only the price,
but the timing and boundaries of its
so-called surge pricing, as well as what
information is provided to drivers and
when. It is impossible to know from
mere observation whether algorithms
are being used in anti-competitive or
discriminatory ways.15
Another concern involves the
possibility that these decision-making
algorithms can cooperate with one
another to engage in price fixing. Such “algorithmic cartels” may
develop even without explicit instructions from the service providers,
because they represent the efficient
solution to maximize each firm’s profits.16 In an on-demand world, more
and more resources that were previ-

Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition, (University of Tennessee Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 267), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2591874.
17 Kevin Werbach, “Is Uber a Common Carrier?” I/S: A
Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 12
(2016).
18 Christina Le, “The Honeymoon’s Over: States Crack Down On
the Virtual World’s Tax-Free Love Affair with E-Commerce,”
Houston Business and Tax Law Journal 7 (2007), 395.
19 Joyce E. Cutler, “Cities Grappling with Challenges of How

to Tax, Regulate Short-Term Rentals,” Bloomberg BNA
Daily Tax Report, October 21, 2014, http://www.bna.com/
cities-grappling-challenges-n17179897258/.
20 Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, “Airbnb Pays Tax Bill of
‘Tens of Millions’ to S.F.,” SFGate, February 18, 2015,
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/M-RAirbnb-pays-tens-of-millions-in-back-6087802.php.
21 Ibid.
22 Now that the company is well established and dominant
in its market, the displacement effects for both hosts and
guests are likely to be limited.

changes. They recognize that a choice
between ill-fitting legacy rules and no
rules at all is not a good outcome.

NOTES
2015), available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-6/computer_and_
communications_industry_association_-_can_big_data_
protect_a_firm_from_competition_13846.pdf.
15 The Federal Trade Commission has formed a new Office
of Technology Research and Investigation, which among
other things has a mandate to examine algorithmic transparency.
16 Jill Priluck, “When Bots Collude,” New Yorker, April 25,
2015, http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/
when-bots-collude; Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke,
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ously subject to fixed prices or delivered by traditional service providers
will be available through dynamically
created algorithmic marketplaces.
Finally, as the Internet of the
World develops, on-demand services
will become more foundational for
commerce and communities. Certain
competitive tactics that are otherwise
legitimate may need to be curtailed
for firms that enjoy the benefits of
controlling essential services, in a
manner akin to utility regulation.17
TAXATION AND FEES
The growth of the On-Demand
Economy raises two kinds of tax
issues. The first involves collection of personal taxes from workers
providing on-demand services, such
as Uber drivers, but these tax issues
generally can be resolved by reference
to existing rules. In contrast, questions about the responsibility of the
on-demand platforms themselves to
remit taxes and fees leads to thornier
issues, as such questions raise issues
of equity with pre-existing providers,
and, as with the sales taxation issues
for e-commerce, drains funding from
local and state governments. The
debates over taxation and fees for ondemand services began as classic conflicts between governments seeking to

impose obligations and new companies, such as Amazon, seeking to avoid
them. But as the history of sales taxes
for e-commerce shows, complications
can eventually be resolved in a manner that does not overly disadvantage
innovative new market entrants.18
The On-Demand Economy
company most directly confronting
taxation is Airbnb. The company has
tussled with cities over proper tax
arrangements.19 Most major American cities impose a tax, in some cases a
substantial one (14% in San Francisco,
for example), on hotel rooms. Because
Airbnb styles itself as a passive intermediary, it originally declined to add
these local taxes to the rates that its
hosts charged to their guests. From
cities’ viewpoint, however, this was a
clear evasion of taxes by a direct competitor to traditional hotels. Nationwide, Airbnb was estimated to owe as
much as $200 million.20
Fairly quickly, there has been a
significant shift. In February 2015,
Airbnb paid an estimated $25 million
in back taxes to the city of San Francisco.21 It is negotiating with several
cities about arrangements that would
require it to collect hotel taxes from
its hosts.22 It is important to emphasize that the company wants these
arrangements because they come with

explicit authorization for Airbnb’s
short-term rentals, which otherwise
would violate current regulations in
many jurisdictions. Through compromise, both sides actually win.
PLATFORM RESPONSIBILITY
According to Uber, the company
serves as a directory for matching
drivers with riders. But the argument that it is essentially a souped-up
phone book flies in the face of reality.
The On-Demand Economy depends
on trust, and consumers trust the
platform, not the individual providers. There have been many questions about what is needed to ensure
against harmful conduct by individuals on an on-demand platform. And
as a practical matter, individual providers of on-demand services may not
have the resources to fully compensate
users for injuries. Therefore, neither
regulators nor consumers have been
satisfied that on-demand platforms
can shift liability to providers in
their networks.
The Internet of the World dramatically alters the dimension that
traditionally distinguishes employees
from independent contractors (i.e.,
how on-demand providers are classified today): control. A new legal category of employment with elements

NOTES
Robert Sprague, “Worker (Mis)Classification in the Sharing
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Journal of Labor and Employment Law, forthcoming.
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tonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/04/what-happenswhen-uber-and-airbnb-become-their-own-regulators.
26 Lawrence Lessig, “The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw
Might Teach,” 113 Harvard Law Review 113 (1999), 501.
27 Nick Grossman, “Regulation, the Internet Way: A Data-First
Model for Establishing Trust, Safety, and Security,” DataSmart City Solutions, April 8, 2015, http://datasmart.ash.
harvard.edu/news/article/white-paper-regulation-theinternet-way-660.
28 Nick Grossman, “Here’s the Solution to the Uber and Airbnb
Problems—and No One Will Like It,” The Slow Hunch, July

5

23, 2015, http://www.nickgrossman.is/2015/07/23/heresthe-solution-to-the-uber-and-airbnb-problems-and-no-onewill-like-it/.

publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu

of both employees and independent
contractors may ultimately
be needed.23
Regardless of how the labor classification is resolved, the broader issue
concerns the level of responsibility
that should inure to these new kinds
of platforms. When something goes
wrong on an on-demand platform,
it is no longer a question of design
or manufacturing flaws in individual
products. Software vendors such as
Microsoft have successfully avoided
liability for defects and security flaws,
based on contractual disclaimers and
limitations on liability, but the Internet of the World potentially turns
everything into a software system.
Since 1996, the “safe harbor”
regime of Section 230 of Title 47 of
the U.S. Code (passed as part of the
Communications Decency Act) has
been a significant protector of online
intermediaries against a host of legal
claims based on the actions of their
users. It protects internet service
providers and all manner of online
content and application services, but
it does not cover services delivered in
the physical world.24 A clear concern
for policymakers, therefore, is how to
construct a safe harbor regime for the
new generation of platforms while still
protecting consumers. On-demand
companies may be the only entities
capable of taking effective enforcement actions against those who cause
injuries, and they may be the only
actors with sufficient resources to
compensate the injured. However,
excessive liability risk can prevent
valuable services from being offered or
it can create perverse incentives. Law
exists, in the first place, to protect certain values, but it undoubtedly shapes

business models as much as it allocates
responsibilities for compensation.

DIGITAL CODE AND DATA AS
ALTERNATIVES TO DIRECT
REGULATION
The imminent collapse of the digital
dichotomy undermines the arguments
for new institutions specially designed
to encompass online activity. Both
in the dotcom era and more recently,
established governance and regulatory
mechanisms have proven sufficiently
adaptable to address new issues raised
by innovative, fast-growing startups.
The need for new flexibility and new
regulation should not be equated with
the inherent superiority of new legal
institutions. Existing regulators, such
as local taxi commissions, may be
obstinate and captured by incumbents,
but they are subject to procedural protections and political influences that
may correct for such flaws. The way
that Uber and Airbnb have gradually
reached accommodations through
local negotiations and state preemptive legislation suggests these factors
can be influential when the startups
are willing to come to the table.
An alternative approach to new
direct regulation would be to enable
private governance activity under
the umbrella of public regulatory
oversight. There are several variants
of self-regulation, co-regulation, and
delegated regulation that would free
private actors from the inefficiencies
of direct government mandates (e.g.,
restrictive licensing and verification
procedures) while still ensuring that
public interest obligations (e.g., rider
or occupant safety and consumer
protection) are met.25 In particular
6

cases, software code might be more
or less desirable than legal code in
regulating behavior. Uber’s reputation
rankings, for example, may produce
better results at preventing invidious
discrimination than established legal
regimes do. With both digital code
and the legal code at the disposal
of policymakers, the question
becomes: which mode of regulation
is most transparent and least subject
to overreach?26
One way to strike this balance
may be a new regulatory paradigm
that shifts from ex ante permission
to ex post data-driven accountability.27 On-demand companies could
be exempted from certain regulations
if they provide a real-time data feed
and the opportunity for regulators to
audit their behavior, demonstrating
their compliance with public policy
mandates.28 Uber and Airbnb initially
resisted requests for granular data that
could assist regulators. Yet they have
begun to recognize that voluntary
disclosure may be superior to (and
potentially could head off ) direct
regulation. Notably, data-sharing
alone is not a complete solution to
the range of legal issues the Internet
of the World generates. Its effectiveness should be judged in each context
based on its ability to achieve wellarticulated public interest objectives.
The general point is that there are
more options than new companies
simply ignoring regulation and regulators blocking their operations. Both
sides of that debate are under the illusion of the digital dichotomy.
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CONCLUSION
The emerging Internet of the World
represents the final destruction of
artificial divisions between real and
virtual. Physical entities are becoming
extensions or information feeds for
digital processors. Many of the advantages previously reserved for digital
goods such as iTunes songs or Netflix
movies are now available to physical
goods and local services provided by
humans. At some point, there is virtually no asset in a growing number of

categories that cannot be delivered on
demand through digital systems.
Policymakers and regulators who
think they can apply old rules to new
platforms will encounter both legal
and practical difficulties. Just as in
the dotcom era, the policy debate
has become a fight over whether new
enterprises should be regulated under
the old regime or left unregulated,
despite the problems of such artificially sharp divisions. The oft-repeated
mantra that law and regulation move
more slowly than technology should

7

not be the end of the discussion. The
celebration of innovation also should
not obscure that law exists to protect
core societal values precisely because
values generally do not change.
Between ill-fitting legacy regulations
and none at all, targeted compromise
facilitated by the eager participation
of a proactive government is the best
strategy for navigating the controversies produced by the Internet of the
World. Indeed, recent history could
not be clearer on this point.
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